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A STANDARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DEcIsIONMAKING UNDER SEPA-Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle,
90 Wn. 2d 59,578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
In 1974 Polygon Corporation began planning construction of a
thirteen-story condominium on Queen Anne Hill in Seattle. Before
applying for a building permit, Polygon submitted an "environmental
checklist" to the Seattle building department.' On the basis of the
checklist, the building department determined that issuance of a per-
mit would constitute a "major [action] significantly affecting the
quality of the environment,"'2 and thus required the preparation of an
environmental impact statement (EIS) under the Washington State
Environmental Policy Act (SEPA).3 A draft EIS was prepared and cir-
culated, and meetings between Polygon and the building department
were held. A final EIS was released in April 1975, and in an atmos-
phere of political controversy 4 the Superintendent of Buildings denied
Polygon's application for a building permit. Polygon petitioned a su-
perior court of King County both to review the permit denial and to
grant a writ of mandamus compelling the Superintendent of Buildings
to issue a permit. The trial court denied the writ, granting summary
1. Seattle has incorporated by reference the procedures set out in chapter 197-10 of
the Washington Administrative Code for the implementation of the procedural require-
ments of the State Environmental Policy Act. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 105735 (Aug.
9, 1976), as amended by Ordinance 107501 (July 17, 1978). The administrative code
provides that an environmental checklist form should be completed by an action propo-
nent when it is unclear whether the action will trigger the impact statement require-
ment. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-050 (1977). See note 3 infra.
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(c) (1976).
3. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 43.21C (1976 & Supp. 1977). SEPA, which is patterned
generally after the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321,
4331-4335 (1976), requires that before a state agency or local government can under-
take an action which will significantly affect the environment, it must prepare and cir-
culate a report which details the environmental impacts of that action and consider that
information in its decisionmaking. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030 (1976). See gener-
ally Comment, Environmental Law: Progress Toward a Coherent Standard for the
Threshold Determination, 54 WASH. L. REV. 159 (1978). The administrative code de-
fines "action" to include both governmental licensing of activities which will involve
modification of the environment, and government activities which themselves might
have environmental impacts. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-040 (1977). These activi-
ties include construction, the sale or lease of natural resources, and the adoption or
amendment of legislation. Id.
4. Polygon contended the decision was based on political, not environmental con-
siderations. See Brief of Appellant at 15-25, Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wn.
2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978). According to one of Polygon's architects, the superinten-
dent decided to deny the permit after a local newspaper reported Mayor Uhlman's al-
leged opposition to the project. Id. at 19-20. See note 39 infra.
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judgment for the city of Seattle. The Washington Supreme Court ac-
cepted direct review and affirmed the trial court in Polygon Corp. v.
City of Seattle.5 The court held that the Superintendent of Buildings
had authority to deny the permit application on the basis of adverse
environmental impacts disclosed in the EIS, 6 emphasizing that the
SEPA requirements are supplemental to all existing state and local
law. 7 More significantly, the court held that the superintendent's deci-
sion was reviewable and that the standard of review it would apply
was the "clearly erroneous" test.8
This note will discuss the necessity of judicial review of administra-
tive decisions9 which are made after the evaluation of an EIS. The
5. 90 Wn. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
6. Id. at 65, 578 P.2d at 1313. The 1977 amendments to SEPA made clear the
legislative intent to grant such authority to agency decisionmakers:
[A] ny governmental action, not requiring a legislative decision, may be condi-
tioned or denied pursuant to this chapter only on the basis of specific adverse envi-
ronmental impacts which are both identified in the environmental documents pre-
pared pursuant to the chapter and stated in writing by the responsible official of the
acting governmental agency.
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.2 IC.060 (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
7. 90 Wn. 2d at 64-65, 578 P.2d at 13 12-13. Polygon argued that the
Superintendent of Buildings had no authority to deny Polygon's permit application. Un-
der the Seattle Municipal Code, the superintendent is required to issue a building per-
mit if an application reveals that the proposed project conforms to the building code.
See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 3.03.020(e) (1972).
Citing with approval a court of appeals decision, Juanita Bay Valley Community
Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140, review denied, 83 Wn. 2d
1002 (1973), the supreme court held that SEPA confers substantive authority upon gov-
ernmental agencies to act on the basis of the environmental impacts disclosed in an EIS.
and pointed out that polices mandated by SEPA would be meaningless absent such au-
thority. 90 Wn. 2d at 64, 578 P.2d at 1312. The court also held that because SEPA is
supplemental to all existing state and local laws under R.C.W. § 43.2 IC.060, it renders
discretionary actions which were previously ministerial. Id. at 65, 578 P.2d at 1313.
Thus, although prior to the legislature's enactment of SEPA the superintendent would
have been required to issue the permit if the proposed structure conformed to the zoning
code, after SEPA he had discretion to deny the permit because of adverse environmen-
tal impacts. In effect, SEPA is one of the "pertinent laws" the superintendent must con-
sider under Seattle Code § 3.03.020(e). Id.
8. 90 Wn. 2d at 69, 578 P.2d at 1314-15. Of the tests considered by the court, the
clearly erroneous test allows the greater scrutiny of agency decisions. See Part I-A in-
fra.
9. An administrative decision is one made by an administrative agency, which has
been defined as
a governmental authority, other than a court and other than a legislative body,
which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication, rulemaking.
investigating, prosecuting, negotiating, settling, or informally acting. An adminis-
trative agency may be called a commission, board, authority, bureau, office, offi-
cer, administrator, department, corporation, administration, division, or agency.
K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 1.01 (1972) (hornbook).
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note concludes that the relatively broad standard chosen by the court
is appropriate for the review of administrative decisions made under
SEPA.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Available Standards of Review
The Washington Administrative Procedure Act 10 contemplates two
standards of judicial review: the arbitrary and capricious standard
and the clearly erroneous standard.'" Although judicial application of
the two standards of review has at times been confused, 12 there are
clear differences between the two tests.
The Washington Supreme Court has stated that an action is arbi-
trary and capricious only when "there is no support in the record for
the action.' 3 When there is a basis for two opinions, an action is not
arbitrary and capricious if the decisionmaker acted honestly and with
due consideration of the facts.' 4 A reviewing court is thus limited to
searching the record for evidence supporting the finding. If such evi-
dence is found, the decision will be upheld.
Conversely, the court has found an action clearly erroneous when
"the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,"'1 5 despite the
presence of evidence supporting the action. The clearly erroneous test
further requires a consideration of the public policy contained in the
relevant legislative act.16
10. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 34.04(1976 & Supp. 1977).
11. R.C.W. § 34.04.130(6) provides:
The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further pro-
ceedings; or it may reverse the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners
may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclu-
sions, or decisions are:
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the entire record as submitted and thepublic pol-
icy contained in the act of the legislature authorizing the decision or order; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious.
WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6) (Supp. 1977).
12. See Andersen, Judicial Review of Agency Fact-Finding in Washington: A Brief
Comment, 13 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 397 (1977).
13. Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wn. 2d 280, 286, 552 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Anderson v. Island County, 81 Wn. 2d 312, 317, 501 P.2d 594, 597
(1972); Bishop v. Town of Houghton, 69 Wn. 2d 786, 794, 420 P.2d 368, 373 (1966).
15. Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wn. 2d 255,259-60, 461 P.2d 531, 534 (1969).
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(e) (Supp. 1977), reproduced in note 11 supra.
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The arbitrary and capricious test is thus a relatively narrow17 stan-
dard of review in that it restricts judicial scrutiny to a search for some
evidence in the record to support the decision. The clearly erroneous
test is a broader standard18 in that it requires a review of the entire
record, which necessarily involves some weighing of the evidence, as
well as a consideration of the public policy embodied in the relevant
act.
B. Substantive Judicial Review Under SEPA Prior to Polygon
Prior to Polygon, the Washington Supreme Court had not ad-
dressed the question of judicial review of substantive administrative
decisions which follow the preparation and evaluation of an EIS.19
The court had, however, determined that the broader clearly errone-
ous test was appropriate in reviewing negative threshold determina-
tions.20 In Norway Hill v. King County Council,2 l the court reviewed
a council determination that approval of a particular subdivision plat
was not a major action significantly affecting the quality of the envi-
ronment and thus did not require the preparation of an EIS.22
The Norway Hill court reasoned that in determining the appropri-
ate scope of review it was "important to consider the broad public
policy"2 3 promoted by SEPA. The court suggested that the policies in-
corporated in SEPA would be thwarted if an EIS were not prepared
See Norway Hill v. King County Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267, 274, 552 P.2d 674, 678
(1976).
17. In this note, the term "narrower" will refer to a relatively less rigorous standard
of review, while the term "broader" will refer to a more rigorous standard.
18. Norway Hill v. King County Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267, 274, 552 P.2d 674, 678
(1976).
19. Substantive review refers to review of decisions to determine whether they are
in accordance with the policies found in SEPA. Procedural review refers to an examina-
tion of whether, in its decisionmaking, an agency has complied with the SEPA procedu-
ral requirements. See notes 46 & 47 and accompanying test infra.
20. A negative threshold determination is a finding that a proposed government ac-
tion is not a major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment and thus
does not require the preparation of an EIS. See note 3 supra.
21. 87 Wn. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976).
22. The council, on appeal, had upheld the decision of a hearing examiner that an
EIS was not necessary. Id. at 270, 552 P.2d at 676. See note 27 infra.
23. Id. at 272, 552 P.2d at 677. The policy goals are contained in R.C.W. §§
43.21C.010 and 43.21C.020. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.010 & .020 (1976). These pol-
icies include protecting the environment for future generations and providing "safe,
healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings" for all
Washington citizens. Id. § 43.2 IC.020(2)(a) & (b).
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in all appropriate cases,24 and that limiting review of threshold deter-
minations to the arbitrary and capricious test would allow local gov-
ernments to " 'short-circuit the [EIS] process by setting statement
thresholds as high as possible within the vague bounds of the arbitrary
and capricious standard.' "25
The court of appeals recently addressed the question of the appro-
priate standard for reviewing a legislative decision based on an EIS.
In Ullock v. City of Bremerton,26 the court reviewed a decision of the
Bremerton City Council to grant a rezone request which had been de-
nied by the city's planning commission. The court held that the coun-
cil decision should be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious
test.27 However, because the Ullock court relied on reasoning tradi-
tionally applied by courts in reviewing zoning decisions28 before the
enactment of SEPA, the decision did not clarify the extent to which
SEPA would affect judicial review of local government decisionmak-
ing.
24. 87 Wn. 2d at 275, 552 P.2d at 679.
25. Id. at 273, 552 P.2d at 678 (quoting Andersen, The National Environmental
Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238, 361 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert ed.
1974)). The Norway Hill court felt that adoption of the clearly erroneous test for review
of negative threshold determinations was consistent with R.C.W. § 43.2 1C.090, which
requires that determinations of government agencies relative to the requirement or ab-
sence of a requirement under SEPA be accorded substantial weight. The court found
that use of the clearly erroneous test would allow the reviewing court to accord substan-
tial weight to agency determinations, but at the same time would allow the court to ex-
amine the determinations in light of the public policies which SEPA promotes. Id. at
275, 552 P.2d at 679. See note 23 supra.
26. 17Wn. App. 573,565 P.2d 1179(1977).
27. Id. at 582, 565 P.2d at 1185. The Ullock court inadequately distinguished Nor-
way Hill by noting that "zoning is a discretionary exercise of police power by a legisla-
tive authority" and that "[i] n reviewing legislative action the courts have traditionally
exercised judicial restraint because of the separation of powers doctrine." Id. (footnote
omitted). Norway Hill also reviewed a decision by a legislative body after an appeal
from an administrative decision. The Norway Hill court did not seem concerned that it
was reviewing a legislative affirmation of an administrative decision, and focused its
discussion on judicial review of administrative decisions under SEPA. Because Polygon
dealt with review of an administrative decision, it leaves unanswered the question of the
standard of review of legislative decisions following the EIS process. It is noteworthy,
however, that Norway Hill adopted the clearly erroneous test to review an administra-
tive decision which had been appealed to a legislative body. This procedure is now avail-
able to all parties who feel aggrieved by the conditioning or denial of a permit applica-
tion pursuant to SEPA under its 1977 amendments. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060
(Supp. 1977). Norway Hill suggests that the availability of legislative review of adminis-
trative decisions does not affect the adoption of the clearly erroneous test.
28. See, e.g., Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wn. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967) (court




II. THE POLYGON COURT'S REASONING
The Polygon court initially noted that Norway Hill had adopted
the clearly erroneous test in order to ensure that the policies contained
in SEPA were realized, and that the same broad standard of review
should be available to a property owner denied a building permit on
the basis of SEPA. The court reasoned that the higher degree of judi-
cial scrutiny provided under the clearly erroneous test was appropri-
ate for review of agency decisions based on an EIS to protect land-
owners from "abusive and arbitrary land use regulations" and to en-
sure that "an appropriate balance between economic, social, and envi-
ronmental values is struck." 29
Two factors were of concern to the court. First, while it held that
the superintendent properly gave great weight to aesthetic factors in
deciding to deny the permit,30 the court recognized that reliance on
nonquantifiable and relatively subjective factors such as visual aes-
thetics creates an increased potential for arbitrary or abusive land use
planning. 31 Underlying this reasoning was a concern that the "poten-
tial for abuse is even stronger where the decision must be made in a
climate of intense political pressures." 32 Second, without the greater
scrutiny available under the clearly erroneous test, it would be diffi-
cult to ensure that environmental values received proper weight in de-
cisionmaking. 33
III. ANALYSIS
Polygon reflects the court's view that landowners should be af-
forded the protection offered by relatively broad judicial review when
their property is subjected to regulation on the basis of unquantifiable
and often subjective environmental considerations. 34  The real
29. 90 Wn. 2d at 69, 578 P.2d at 1315.
30. Id. SEPA provides that a purpose of the Act is to "[a] ssure for all people of
Washington safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing sur-
roundings." WASH. REV. CODE § 43.2 IC.020(2)(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
31. 90Wn. 2dat69,578 P.2d at 1315.
32. Id. See note 4 supra & note 39 infra.
33. 90Wn. 2dat69,578 P.2dat 1315.
34. The 1977 SEPA amendments provide that governmental actions not requiring a
legislative decision may be conditioned or denied pursuant to SEPA only on the basis of
specific adverse environmental impacts disclosed in the EIS and stated in writing by the
acting governmental official. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.2 IC.060 (Supp. 1977). The amend-
ment further provides that after September 1978, or September 1980 in the case of
counties with a population less than 70,000 and cities with a population less than
37,000, such conditions or denials must be based on policies developed by the acting lo-
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importance of Polygon, however, lies in the application of the clearly
erroneous standard of review to agency decisions which approve ac-
tions after the preparation of an EIS.35 As a result of Polygon, Wash-
ington courts are able to examine an agency's substantive decision-
making to determine whether the environmental impacts disclosed by
an EIS are in fact considered by the decisionmaker before an action is
approved.
The remainder of this note outlines why substantive judicial review
of agency decisionmaking under SEPA is necessary, and concludes
that the broad standard chosen by the court is appropriate for reasons
in addition to the need to protect landowners. First, in order to ensure
that the policies promoted by SEPA are in fact incorporated into
agency decisionmaking, it is necessary that the decisions be subject to
critical review.36 Second, the major basis for judicial deference to ad-
ministrative decisions-the expertise of the particulfr-agency-does
not apply when the agency is acting outside the area of that expertise,
as is usually the case under SEPA.37 Third, the fundamental nature of
the rights protected by SEPA makes a more intense standard of re-
view appropriate. 38 Finally, because the legislature has made it clear
that the mandate announced by SEPA is statewide, broader review of
administrative decisions is necessary to ensure that the statewide pol-
icy is not undermined by inappropriate3 9 political or economic pres-
cal governments and incorporated into "resolutions, regulations, ordinances, plans, or
codes." Id. This should both introduce greater certainty into decisionmaking and pro-
vide added protection for landowners.
35. Polygon involved an agency decision to deny a building permit to a developer.
Presumably, the same standard of review would be applied to review agency decisions
which hold that the benefits resulting from an action outweigh the adverse environmental
impacts disclosed in the EIS.
36. The history of litigation under SEPA reflects that local governments have often
complied with SEPA only after judicial review of their actions was sought. See Eastlake
Community Council v. Roanoke Assoc., Inc., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973)
(renewal of a building permit is a major action); Stempel v. Department of Water Re-
sources, 82 Wn. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973) (issuance of a water use permit is a major
action which may require the preparation of an EIS); Juanita Bay Valley Community
Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (issuance ofa grading permit is
a major action), review denied, 83 Wn. 2d 1002 (1973). See also, Part III-A infra.
37. See Part III-B-I infra.
38. SEPA provides that "each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a
healthful environment." WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(3) (1976). See Part III-B-2
infra.
39. The Polygon court was concerned that the superintendents decision was made
"in a climate of intense political pressures." 90 Wn. 2d at 69, 578 P.2d at 1315. The
court did not differentiate, however, between those political pressures which naturally
arise as a result of public participation in the EIS process, and those which undermine
the process. Increased public participation in government decisionmaking is one of the
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sures at the local level. 40
A. Full Disclosure or Full Consideration: The
Need for Substantive Review
SEPA provides that "to the fullest extent possible: (1) [t] he poli-
cies, regulations, and laws of the State of Washington shall be inter-
preted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth
[herein] ."41 Those policies include ensuring "for all people of Wash-
ington safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally
pleasing surroundings." 42 The primary vehicle provided for achieving
these policy objectives is the EIS.43 Under SEPA, before a branch of
state or local government undertakes an action "significantly affecting
the quality of the environment, 4 4 it must prepare a detailed statement
outlining specifically what the environmental effects of the action will
be.45
In the sense that SEPA requires that environmental consequences
of government actions be revealed before the action is taken, it is an
environmental full-disclosure law. 46 SEPA, however, does more than
goals promoted by SEPA. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.2 1C.020 (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 197-10-450 (1977). That participation necessarily involves the exertion of political
pressure on government decisionmakers. See N. ORLOFF. THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT PROCESS 104-22 (1978). How the "appearance of fairness" doctrine will
limit this kind of activity in Washington remains unclear, despite the Polygon court's re-
fusal to extend the doctrine to cover governmental decisionmaking when no public
hearing is required. 90 Wn. 2d at 67-68, 578 P.2d at 1314. Clearly. however, some types
of political pressures are inappropriate and should be guarded against. See, e.g., Save a
Valuable Environment v. City of Bothell, 89 Wn. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978) (mem-
bers of local planning commission associated with Chamber of Commerce).
40. See Part iII-B-2 infra.
41. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(1976).
42. Id. § 43.2 1C.020(2)(b). See note 23 supra.
43. See note 3 supra.
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.2 1C.030(2)(c) (1976).
45. In reality, when the action proponent is from the private sector, the proponent
prepares the EIS. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-100(4) (1977).
46. Norway Hill, 87 Wn. 2d at 272. 552 P.2d at 677. It has been argued that SEPA
is no more than that; in other words, once an agency has indicated what the impact of its
action will be, it is not only free to ignore that information, it in fact does not have the
authority to condition or deny that action on the basis of the impacts disclosed in an
EIS. See Polygon. 90 Wn. 2d at 63, 578 P.2d at 13 12; note 7 supra. The Washington Su-
preme Court suggested as early as 1973 that agencies in fact did have substantive au-
thority to deny actions on the basis of impact disclosed in an EIS. In Stempel v. Depart-
ment of Water Resources, the court quoted from R.C.W. § 43.2 IC.030(2)(b) in holding
that SEPA required that the " 'presently unquantified environment amenities and
values will be given appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic
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impose procedural requirements; it confers substantive authority on
decisionmakers and requires that they consider the environmental im-
pacts before proceeding with an action. 47 Without review of agency
decisions, there is a danger that the policy goals contained in SEPA
would not be realized because agencies would be free to proceed with
an action once the procedural requirements of SEPA were met, re-
gardless of the environmental consequences.
An analysis of the cases under the National Environmental Policy
Act of 196948 (NEPA), the legislation upon which SEPA is based,49
suggests that review of agency decisions, as well as review of agency
compliance with procedural requirements, is necessary in order to ef-
fectuate environmental policies. The NEPA cases reflect confusion as
to whether the Act imposed more than procedural requirements on
agency decisionmakers. 50 The reluctance of some federal courts to re-
view agency decisions under NEPA has sometimes frustrated achieve-
ment of the goals of the Act.51 As Judge Skelly Wright observed,
"What possible purpose could there be in requiring... [an EIS] ...
if the boards are free to ignore entirely the contents of the statement?
and technical considerations."' Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wn. 2d
109, 118, 508 P.2d 166, 172 (1973). See also Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n. v.
City of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140, review denied, 83 Wn. 2d 1002 (1973).
The 1977 SEPA amendments, which specifically refer to this substantive authority, re-
solve all doubt about the legislature's intent. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.2 1C.060 (Supp.
1977); note 6 supra. Polygon should end all argument that SEPA does not confer sub-
stantive authority to agency decisionmakers.
47. See note 46 supra.
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321,4331-4335 (1976).
49. See Leschi v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271, 525 P.2d 774
(1974).
50. Compare National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971)
(once the procedural requirements of NEPA are met, there can be no further judicial re-
view), with Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th
Cir. 1972) (substantive review is available). For a discussion of early cases under
NEPA, see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973); Note, The National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969: Toward a Substantive Standard of Review, 4 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 153 (1974). See also Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and
the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974).
5 1. See Note, The National Environmental Policy Act: What Standard of Judicial
Review?, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 643, 651 (1973). One commentator suggested,
As lawyers and jurists consider the potential for a second generation of NEPA
cases dealing primarily with assuring that the actual substantive policies of the Act
become a national reality, it is important that they remember that unenforceable
obligations are not obligations at all, and unenforceable rights, no matter how
grandly stated, are nothing more than empty words.
Yarrington, Judicial Review of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Generation of




NEPA was meant to do more than than regulate the flow of papers in
the federal bureaucracy."5 2
By approving substantive review of agency decisions under SEPA,
the Washington Supreme Court has avoided the confusion which has
plagued interpretations of NEPA. Further, in choosing the relatively
broad "clearly erroneous" test the court has brought the achievement
of the goals embodied in SEPA a step closer to reality. Had the court
chosen to apply the arbitrary and capricious test, reviewing courts
could not have ensured that agencies considered environmental fac-
tors in decisionmaking. The court has stated that it would be a "rare
occasion" to find that an agency had failed to meet the requirements
of the arbitrary and capricious test.53 Recent holdings indicate that
the decision would be upheld as long as there was room for two opin-
ions, and the decision had been made honestly. 54
The clearly erroneous test, on the other hand, allows the court to
review the entire record while considering the legislative statement of
public policy as contained in SEPA. 55 Although the court will not
substitute its judgment for the agency's or overturn an agency's deci-
sion unless it is convinced that a mistake has been made, this broader
52. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 197 1) (holding that the Atomic Energy Commission's
internal procedures did not comply with NEPA). Judge Wright stated that the duty of
the courts in interpreting NEPA was to see that "important legislative purposes, her-
alded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the fed-
eral bureaucracy." Id. at 111 I. Furthermore, "if the decision was reached procedurally
without individualized consideration and balancing of environmental factors--con-
ducted fully and in good faith-it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse." Id. at
1115.
53. Northern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 69 Wn. 2d
472, 479, 418 P.2d 735, 740 (1966) (reinstating the commission's order denying the
company's request for extension of carrier authority).
54. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. Obviously there is room for two
opinions in every case that reaches the final stage in the impact statement process. Fur-
ther, because most agencies are not directly engaged in environmental protection, they
may make a good faith decision without consideration of environmental impacts. Ad-
dressing this issue, a commentator wrote about NEPA:
It does not set up an agency to supervise private conduct, nor does it pinpoint a
particular ill, for which a precisely focused statute may legislate a cure. Instead, the
Act attempts to regulate the way in which all federal agencies make decisions. They
are told to consider matters alien to their own limited self-interest, to expend time
and money on statement preparation, to delay favorite projects, and to do all this
when the benefits of the process do not redound to the agency involved but to the
good of the environment.
Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
238, 361 (E. Dolgin &T. Guilbert ed. 1974).
55. See notes 15 & 16 and accompanying text supra.
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review may ensure that the legislative directive of actual consideration
of the environmental impacts of proposed actions is implemented.
B. Further Bases for Broad Review Under SEPA
1. Limited agency expertise
The traditional reasoning supporting limited judicial review of
agency decisionmaking, except in questions of law, is that overly
broad review "would destroy the values of agencies created to secure
the benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous admin-
istration in complicated fields." 56 This reasoning is especially persua-
sive when an agency being reviewed was specifically created to ad-
minister a particular legislative enactment. 57 But the rule of deference
to administrative decisionmaking, with all its apparent reason-
ableness, has its limitations. As then Professor Felix Frankfurter
pointed out, the proper scope of judicial review in a particular context
often cannot be responsibly determined by applying a rigid formula.58
On the contrary, judicial review "is colored by the whole structure of
which it forms a part, just as . . it derives significance from the na-
ture of the subject matter under review as well as from the agency
which is reviewed." 59 Professor Louis Jaffe accurately stated that, "In
judicial review, the court must evaluate the relevance and weight of
expertness. '6 0 Thus, the proper scope of judicial review in a given
case should reflect the particular circumstances inherent in that class
of cases.
A strong justification for the court's adoption of the clearly errone-
ous test in Polygon is that the usual basis for limited review-defer-
56. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 579 (1976). There is also a separation of pow-
ers argument: courts should not intrude into areas in which agencies have been set up to
function. Nevertheless, by providing for the clearly erroneous test for review of agency
decisions, the legislature has made it clear that it does not perceive that standard of re-
view as intrusive per se. Further, in examining the proper scope of review of agency de-
cisionmaking in Norway Hill, the court made it clear that it did not perceive the clearly
erroneous test as being overly intrusive. 87 Wn. 2d at 275, 522 P.2d at 679. See Part I-
A supra.
57. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Associated Gas & Elec., 99 F.2d
795 (2d Cir. 1938). The court reasoned that because a function of the S.E.C. was to ad-
minister the Interstate Commerce Act, its "interpretation of the act should control un-
less plainly erroneous." Id. at 798.
58. Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 614, 619-20
(1927).
59. Id. at 620.




ence to administrative expertise-is not present in the class of cases
under SEPA. 61 Because SEPA is supplemental to existing state and lo-
cal law,6 2 administrators in all agencies are required to incorporate
environmental considerations into their decisionmaking. It cannot
reasonably be suggested that, as a result of the legislature's enactment
of SEPA, all administrators now qualify as experts in the implementa-
tion of the Act.
Comparing the expertise of agencies and courts is helpful in de-
terming the proper scope of judicial review under SEPA. While ad-
ministrators, if they are experts at all, tend to be trained either in
limited, technical fields or in the administrative process itself, judges
are experts in the balancing of economic, social, and policy interests.
Because the goals embodied in SEPA require a balancing of such in-
terests, it is appropriate for courts to investigate the degree to which
those goals are implemented by administrators. 63 Applying the clearly
erroneous test to review administrative decisions under SEPA is a re-
61. Lead agencies are required to circulate draft EIS's to other agencies which may
have relevant environmental expertise. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-460 (1977). Nev-
ertheless, two factors militate against treating lead agencies as "expert" because they
have sought the advice of other agencies. First, the process by which agencies review
EIS's may or may not be adequate, due to lack of time, staff, and other resources. Sec-
ond, the commenting agency will be responding only to information that is within its
area of expertise. This leaves the lead agency to synthesize the information it has re-
ceived and try to determine total environmental impact.
62. See note 7 supra.
63. Professor Bernard Schwartz has written:
The utilization of administrative expertness does not, however, militate against
control by the courts. "The well-learned lesson of democratic government with 'ex-
perts' is that they should be kept on tap but not on top." In ensuring this subordina-
tion the nonexpertness of our courts plays an essential part. It is the great virtue of
our judicial process that it employs men not specialists in any one field of legal en-
deavor but capable by disposition and training of dealing with all types of cases.
"The judicial process," as an eminent American jurist has put it, "requires a differ-
ent kind of expertise-the unique capacity to see things in their context .. ." The
limitations of the expert-inability to see beyond the narrow confines of his own
experience, intolerance of the layman, and excessive zeal in carrying out his own
policy regardless of the cost to the other, broader interests of society-are sub-
jected under our system to the trained scrutiny of the nonexpert judge, who, unhin-
dered by the professional bias of the specialist, is able to take a broader view than
that of merely promoting administrative policy in the case at hand without count-
ing the ultimate cost.
B. SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD 319 (1954)
(emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). Arguing for a broader standard of judicial
review in NEPA cases, Justice Douglas stated:
Although value judgments are inevitable and even though the Commission's bal-
ancing of environmental costs with other factors may be entitled to some defer-
ence, I share... doubts that... the balance struck by an agency unskilled in envi-
ronmental matters should be reviewed only through the lens of the "substantial
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sponsible exercise of judicial discretion in an area where judges, not
administrators, possess the relevant expertise.64
2. SEPA: Statewide Mandate That Certain Fundamental Rights be
Protected
Further justification for the broad review of agency decisionmak-
ing under SEPA is the importance of the rights protected by the Act.
SEPA states that "each person has a fundamental and inalienable
right to a healthful environment." 65 This is a strong statement of legis-
lative intent66 and provides support for those commentators who
argue that environmental rights should be granted constitutional sta-
tus. 67 Indeed, the fact that SEPA is supplemental to all existing state
and local laws68 gives the Act a constitutional dimension. The nature
of these environmental rights makes it appropriate, and may require,
that courts more closely scrutinize administrative actions when per-
sonal interests in life, health, and safety are involved.69
evidence" test.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 407 U.S. 926, 931
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 197 1). See also
Sive, Some Thoughts on an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative
Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 629-30 (1970).
64. L. JAFFE, supra note 60, at 580. Professor Jaffe has noted another problem: the
tendency of administrators to inject their own policy values into decisionmaking.
The expert is often ... seeking to advance his conception of policy, and to give it
greater sanctity by embodying it in the seeming objectivity of an "expert disci-
pline." ... The expert judgment is rarely "pure," rarely determined solely by the
criteria in its field. In most cases, the administrative action will be as much deter-
mined by power drives and legal attitudes as it is by technical considerations.
Id.
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(3) (1976).
66. The language in SEPA is more forceful than the NEPA preamble, which "recog-
nizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c)
(1976). Because SEPA is identical to NEPA in many respects, one must assume that the
legislature was fully aware of the added strength of this language. "The choice of this
language in SEPA indicates in the strongest possible terms the basic importance of envi-
ronmental concerns to the people of this state. It is a far stronger policy statement than
that found in the National Environmental Policy Act.... Leschi Improvement Coun-
cil v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271, 280, 525 P.2d 774, 781
(1974).
67. See, e.g., Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment; E=MC2: Environment
Equals Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 674 (1970);
Note, Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. REV. 458 (1970).
68. Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 510
P.2d 1140, review denied, 83 Wn. 2d 1002 (1973).
69. Judge Bazelon wrote, in 197 1:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long and fruitful col-
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Further, R.C.W. § 43.21C.010 declares environmental protection
to be a "state policy."'70 Effectuation of that policy requires that local
decisionmaking be somewhat insulated from local political and eco-
nomic pressures. 71 Without the broader scrutiny provided under the
clearly erroneous test, however, it would be difficult for reviewing
courts to determine whether decisions made in communities unsym-
pathetic to SEPA's environmental policies were in fact made after an
appropriate consideration of the the environmental impacts of a pro-
posed action.
IV. CONCLUSION
The real significance of Polygon lies in the court's willingness to
undertake substantive review of final agency decisions after the evalu-
ation of an EIS. Without such review, SEPA would be destined to be-
come a meaningless exercise in bureaucratic paper shuffling, for once
the procedural requirements of the Act had been met, decisionmaking
could go on as before whether or not the decisionmaker had actually
read the EIS. This was not the intent of the legislature in enacting
SEPA.
The implications of Polygon may cause anxiety in some quarters.
Nevertheless, both the legislature and the courts should resist any at-
tempts to limit the court's holding. Polygon will neither end nor se-
verely limit development in Washington; it will merely allow review-
ing courts to ensure that the environmental policies contained in
SEPA are incorporated into agency decisionmaking, not only in pro-
cedure but also in substance. This should lead to more thoughtful and
laboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts. For many years,
courts have treated administrative policy decisions with great deference, confining
judicial attention primarily to matters of procedure. On matters of substance, the
courts regularly upheld agency action, with a nod in the direction of the "substan-
tial evidence" test, and a bow to the mysteries of administrative expertise....
[T] he character of administrative litigation is changing .... [Clourts are increas-
ingly asked to review administrative action that touches on fundamental personal
interests in life, health, and liberty. These interests have always had a special claim
to judicial protection, in comparison with the economic interests at stake in a
ratemaking or licensing proceeding.
To protect these interests from administrative arbitrariness, it is necessary ... to
insist on strict judicial scrutiny of administrative action.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
See also Anderson, supra note 54, at 280-81.
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.010(1)(1976).
71. See note 39 supra.
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reasoned development and will help preserve one of Washington's
most important resources: its environment.
Michael W. Elsass
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